Friday, February 11, 2005

A Game of Chance?

Some of the documentaries I saw this week dealt with Quantum Mechanics, the probabilities involved at the subatomic level, and the shocking possibility of unlimited Parallel Universes.

This quantum uncertainty leads to the theory that everything that could happen (i.e. has a definite probability of happening) does happen. For example, if an event E can either happen or not happen (i.e. there is a certain probability P(E) = p of it happening, and a certain probability P'(E) = 1-p of it not happening), then it will both happen and not happen. This seemingly impossible situation is explained by the existence of Parallel Universes; that is to say, there is one universe where event E does happen, and another where event E does not. Counting up all possible probabilities results in a practically unlimited number of Parallel Universes, many of which you and I do not even exist in. But what is more mind-boggling is the notion that you and I could be existing in a similarly countless number of other universes.

It is of course possible to explain this apparent randomness with (pre)determinism. One may examine the roll of an ordinary die of six faces, each of which, logically to us, has the probability of 1/6 of facing upward on any given roll. But is this really true? Is the result really probabilistic? Or is it predetermined from the moment the die leaves your fingers? If we have a sufficiently fast mechanism for measuring the instantaneous velocity (linear and angular) of the die travelling through the air, could we not calculate the exact location of where it will land and at what angle, as well as the subsequent rebounding motion and finally where and how it comes to rest? Therefore, I think it is safe to say that the roll of a die appears random to our limited minds, because our minds lack the computational power to calculate, in the second or two between the toss of the die to its coming to rest, the result predetermined by the original throw and the surface the die comes into contact with.

This leads me to thinking about predeterminism in Christian theology. It has long bothered many people, Christians and non-Christians alike, to believe that God has predetermined the history of the Earth from beginning to end. Where does freewill come from then, if everything is predetermined? Dr. William Lane Craig presents this case: Suppose God foreknows at time t1 that Alex shall do X at time t2, where t1 is earlier than t2. In order for freewill to hold, Alex must have the power to not do X. Dr. Craig's argument goes, if Alex indeed does not do X at t2, God would have foreknown at t1. This does not mean that Alex has the ability to change what God knew at t1 by what he does at t2; rather, whatever Alex does at t2 merely asserts the "counterfactuals".

I have not taken courses in philosophy, but what Counterfactual Theories of Causation appear to say is as follows: "Event a caused event b," so in terms of counterfacuals, "If a had not occurred, b would not have occurred". In other words then, "If b occurred, a must have occurred". This means that whatever Alex does at t2, God must have always foreknown accordingly.

Predeterminism remains a tricky concept in Christian theology. What I presented above are merely the musings of a sleepless night and should not be taken as a thorough examination or a well thought-out argument.

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